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An increasingly important facet of the international arms trade are so-called offsets, 
arrangements that obligate the arms seller to reinvest (“offset”) arms sales proceeds in the 
purchasing country. In justifying arms expenditure and in promoting local industrial 
activity, offsets are claimed to offer significant benefits to developing countries, yet until 
recently there has been little research on how well offsets work in practise. This paper 
considers some of the issues and current empirical evidence. We find virtually no case 
where offset arrangements have yielded unambiguous net benefits for a country’s 
economic development. As a general rule arms trade offset deals are more costly than 
‘off-the-shelf’ arms purchases, create little by way of new or sustainable employment, do 
not appear to contribute in any substantive way to general economic development, and 
with very few exceptions do not result in significant technology transfers, not even within 
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1. Introduction 
 
Offsets are an increasingly important part of the international trade in arms. When 
countries procure defence equipment from a foreign supplier they look to reduce the cost 
in a number of ways. They may become involved in the development and (co)production 
of the product, e.g., joint production, licensed production, or sub-contractor production. 
Foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and countertrade are other methods of 
compensation, which may take place in the civilian rather than military sector. Each form 
of involvement – lumped together under the concept of “offsets” – carries its own 
implications for costs, programme risks, control over specifications and wider industrial 
and economic benefits (Hartley, 1995). Countries apply different criteria for whether 
offset obligations are required for a particular transaction and what types of offsets are 
acceptable. While a generally agreed-upon definition of offsets has yet to emerge, by way 
of illustration the United States government defines offsets as ‘industrial compensation 
practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-government or 
commercial sales of defence articles and/or defence services’ 
1. The UK definition is 
more restrictive (Martin, 1996). 
 
In principle, offsets hold out great promise for developing and emerging economies. They 
can spend their budgets on arms and yet also help their industrialisation, both through 
developing their arms-related industries and other related and unrelated industries. One of 
the most recent, and globally high profile, deals has been that of South Africa whose 
government in September 1999 approved a R29,9 billion arms acquisition programme for 
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).
2  To justify this decision to 
purchase from foreign suppliers and to win public support for the arms deal, the South 
African government stressed the potential positive effects of the proposed industrial 
                                                 
1 This definition is taken from “Offsets in Military Exports” (U.S. Department of Export Administration, 
Washington D.C., December 1998). 
2 The original programme and list of preferred suppliers was approved by cabinet in November 1998. The 
revised programme, approved by cabinet in September 1999 was divided into two tranches: the first 
tranche, costing R21,3 billion, will include 3 submarines and 4 corvettes from Germany, 12 jet trainers 
from Britain, 9 light fighters from Britain and Sweden, and 30 light utility helicopters from Italy. The 
second tranche, costing an additional R8,6 billion will include 12 jet trainers from Britain and 19 light 
fighters from Britain and Sweden. The 4 maritime helicopters from Britain, and the balance of 10 light 
utility helicopters from Italy are excluded from the revised programme. J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  3 
participation offers (the local term for offsets) on investment, job creation and growth in 
the local-defence related industry and the national economy. At the time of approving the 
programme, government stated that the foreign suppliers had made industrial 
participation offers worth R104 billion which would result in the creation of more than 
65,000 jobs over a period of 7 years (Batchelor and Dunne, 2000; also see Batchelor and 
Dunne, 1998). 
 
The difference between the expected benefit and the actual ones is stark, and the country 
is presently involved in dealing with the fall-out. The degree of coverage, of transparency 
and of debate is unprecedented and has provided important, and disturbing, insights into 
the workings of the international arms market. It has highlighted the increasing 




This paper considers the economics of offsets for developing and emerging economies. It 
draws upon the recent collection of studies in Brauer and Dunne (2004), one of the two 
collections of this type available, the other being Martin (1996). Section 2 considers 
general economic issues; section 3 focuses on the nature of offsets in developing and 
emerging economies; section 4 presents some of the available evidence on the impact of 
offsets; and section 5 concludes. The emphasis is placed on the empirical evidence. 
 
2. Economic Aspects of Defence Offsets  
 
It is useful to distinguish between direct offsets, which includes goods and services 
directly related to the equipment the purchaser is buying (e.g., local co-production of 
parts of the weapon system being purchased), and indirect offsets, i.e., military or civilian 
goods and services unrelated to the specific defence equipment purchased. This can 
include foreign investment and countertrade (barter, counter-purchase and buy-back). 
                                                 
3 The background to, and the experience of, South Africa may be found in Dunne (2003), Batchelor and 
Dunne (2000), and Batchelor and Willet (1998). J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  4 
Such offset deals are an increasingly important part of the international trade in military 
equipment, especially in the aerospace industry (Martin, 1996, Udis and Maskus, 1991). 
 
The nature of offset agreements depends upon the type of buyer. In the case of a country 
with an existing defence industry, the emphasis of the offsets will often be on limiting the 
impact on the domestic industry by compelling a relocation of economic activity from the 
supplier to the purchasing country, including technology transfers. This relocation of 
economic activity may also be linked with offsets that focus on non-military products. 
 
While government publications often herald offset agreements as beneficial to the 
purchasing country, the issue is much more complex and the costs and benefits of such 
programmes have been the subject of some debate. The current state of research suggests 
that offset agreements more likely reflect attempts to politically justify foreign 
procurement, especially in emerging democracies, than that they reflect proven economic 
benefits (Brauer and Dunne, 2004). 
 
If a country with a local defence industry decides to procure new weapons systems then it 
has to decide whether to produce the weapons locally or to purchase from a foreign 
supplier. Local production is likely to be the more expensive option and the desired level 
of technology may not be available. If the decision is made to import then there is usually 
a search for a foreign supplier that offers the “best” package of weapon system and offset 
deal. If a local defence industry exists, it is bound to be adversely affected by 
procurement orders going abroad, but evidence suggests that for small countries 
maintaining a local defence industry is expensive and uneconomic in any case (Dunne, 
1995, 1996). This means importing arms may be economically more sensible, especially 
as there is usually a premium attached to offsets with the result that the purchase price is 
higher than it would have been in the absence of offsets.  
 
The economic welfare issues are unclear. Offsets relocate production to the purchasing 
nation. This trade diversion can be welfare reducing in that imports, including arms 
imports, can create wealth by allowing domestic labour resources to be moved to more J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  5 
productive (internationally competitive) areas of the economy. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the international arms market is not perfectly competitive, and offsets may 
improve efficiency if they side-step non-tariff barriers and lead to a search for more 
efficient subcontractors. Offsets may be considered as a subset of the myriad price-
quality-quantity trade-offs which characterise negotiations for large transactions (Martin 
and Hartley, 1995). They may lead to reduced transaction costs (reducing the number of 
contracts per trade) but may also inhibit the flexibility of negotiating advantageous deals 




Competitive bidding leads companies to compete on offsets and invent ingenious ways to 
deal with them. This sometimes leads to unrealistic offset agreements. The complexity of 
some agreements has led to the establishment of specialist agencies (e.g., Australia, 
Spain) within government to deal with offset programmes. This has helped both 
purchasers and suppliers to overcome the problems of the past, but there still remain 
problems. For instance, it is possible that the supplier may plan to renege, building into 
the purchase price the cost of reneging (moral hazard); it is often unclear how much of 
the offsets is genuinely new work; what is the technical content; and which companies 
and regions will benefit from the offsets. In addition, defence offsets have often been 
inappropriately linked with development aid. 
 
For a small country the issue may be to maintain an intelligent customer capability 
(intelligent buyer) and to be able to maintain and upgrade systems rather than to retain 
domestic production capability. This might be achieved through maintaining 
technological capabilities in research establishments and requiring technology transfers, 
rather than retaining a local defence industrial base. If there are to be defence offsets then 
they could be used for developing civil products and/or to assist with the conversion of 
                                                 
4 The impact on the supplying firm can be negative if, for example, it ends up with lower quality 
components as part of countertrade. Countertrade can destroy local industry, tending to affect smaller 
contractors. This has been recognised in the U.S. with workers from a subcontractor demonstrating against 
countertrade negotiations which could have replaced their input.  J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  6 
defence companies rather than attempts to maintain local defence capabilities. Any other 
solution could be considered second best. 
 
3. Offsets in Developing and Emerging Economies 
 
When an arms deal is agreed and offsets are negotiated developing countries can consider 
both defence and non-defence offset deals. Depending on government policy objectives, 
they may wish to export some agricultural products or a low-tech civilian good, or they 
may wish to develop or maintain a defence industrial base and develop into niche 
markets. As Brauer (2002) and Kinsella (2000) discuss, the nature of arms production 
varies across developing countries and depends to some extent on aspirations to become a 
member of the defence producing elite. The nature of arms production is complex 
ranging from simple maintenance activities to completely independent R&D and 
production (Krause, 1992), with most developing economies closer to the former. Their 
motives for developing these capabilities range across the strategic, political and 
economic spectrum. 
 
Arms importing countries’ offset objectives do of course evolve over time and their 
strategies change as their objectives evolve. Some developing economies have targeted 
certain arms niches that they wish to learn to master for themselves and they structure 
arms import acquisition and offset demands toward the fulfilment of that goal (e.g., 
Singapore, Taiwan). Other countries (e.g., Brazil, India, Indonesia) appear driven by 
regional power ambitions that would dictate the development of an indigenous ability to 
produce a comprehensive range of weapon systems in-country and so they pursued or 
pursue an arms sourcing and offset strategy with broad technology transfer requirements. 
Yet other states (e.g., South Korea) seek an ability to produce a wide spectrum of systems 
not because of regional power ambitions but because of a generalized desire and 
increasing ability to broadly participate in all industrial markets. Still other states appear 
to view arms offsets as an opportunity to revive a collapsed or failed indigenous arms J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  7 
industry (e.g., Poland). And still other countries (e.g., South Africa) appear to view arms 
offsets as a way to simply get the arms and keep the money at home as well.
5 
 
While offset policies vary among states there are some common characteristics. These 
characteristics include (1) that importing countries generally mandate offset requirements 
by law, often to 100 percent of the arms contract value, (2) that offset requirements kick 
in for minimum contract value, often as low as US$5 million, (3) that multipliers are 
frequently attached to offset deals, meaning that a specific transaction value (say, $10 
million) can be multiplied to count toward a higher value (say, $15 million) in fulfilment 
of the offset obligation, (4) that virtually all arms trade contracts now contain clauses that 
subject arms exporters to a variety of penalties for non-fulfilment of offset obligations 
(e.g., exclusion from consideration for future contracts in the country). In addition, there 
are expectations (5) that offsets will reduce arms acquisition costs, (6) that job creation 
and generalized economic development will result in the arms acquiring country, (7) that 
the offset will result in new and sustainable work (i.e., that the offset not merely replace 
work that would have been sourced in-country anyway and that it not be one-off but 
continuous work), and (8) that the offsets result in general and specific technology 
transfers since technology is seen as the key to future economic prosperity. 
 
Elements crucially missing in these offset characteristics are offset contract monitoring, 
auditing, and feedback to the importing country’s defence contract-issuing organization. 
Very few countries have ever carried out even a single formal and independent offset-
contract audit to determine to what degree, if any, the hopes with which offset contracts 
are invested come to fruition. 
 
4. Impact of Offsets 
 
In the political and news media arena, the expectation is that offsets will reduce arms 
procurement costs to the importing country; and certainly that there be no cost premium 
                                                 
5 On the arms exporting side of the ledger, arms exporters (e.g, in the U.S., U.K, Sweden, and others) 
almost always see offset requirements as a costly distraction and nuisance (e.g., Mawdsley and Brzoska, 
2004, p. 106), something that has to be done to win contracts but that they would prefer to be able to avoid. J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  8 
as compared to off-the-shelf arms purchases. But this is illusionary: the administrative 
cost of offsets alone is believed to cost arms sellers anywhere from 7 to 10 percent of 
contract value (Markusen, 2004, p. 71), and this cost must be recovered in some form. 
 
In Brazil, Perlo-Freeman reports that “the sheer size and complexity of major warship 
projects have given rise to serious cost inflation and delays, unmitigated by export 
orders” (2004, p. 197) and across all arms acquisition categories he notes “the added cost 
of such deals compared with off-the-shelf procurement” and that “this was accepted by 
the government as a necessary price for obtaining technology” (2004, p. 197). This 
assessment also reflects India’s experience where licensed technology programs in tanks, 
aircraft, and naval vessels “faced delays and cost overruns, and resulted in spectacular 
failures” (Baskaran, 2004, p. 218). In its dealings with western suppliers, such as Britain, 
France, and Sweden, India tended to make use of credit arrangements “to cover the 
foreign exchange burden. However, evidence suggests that such arrangements resulted in 
increased selling prices” (Baskaran, 2004, p. 221). Likewise, India’s arms relation with 
Russia and Eastern Europe “appears to have resulted in a significant burden on the Indian 
economy” (pp. 223-224). 
 
Regarding South Korea, Chinworth writes that it “would be premature to label the 
country’s policies and experiences as a collective failure, but it also would be generous to 
characterize them as a success” (2004, p. 243). For Indonesia’s civilian aircraft program, 
based on offset deals, Bitzinger reports that its “apparent success was illusory ... In 
reality, [it] was a bloated, state-owned white elephant, employing many more workers 
than it needed and was awash in excess production capacity” (2004, p. 264). For instance, 
the government poured about US$1 billion into a particular civilian airliner that 
eventually failed to receive FAA certification and thereby made it impossible to bring the 
aircraft to market anywhere. 
 
South Africa’s recent arms procurement deal with certain European nations was 
trumpeted to generate some 65,000 new jobs yet Dunne and Lamb argue that while “the 
arms deal has had a positive effect on South Africa’s economy, particularly in defense-J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  9 
related industry – after all, the billions must buy something – … there is little evidence 
that the predicted level of benefits have been or will be reached” (2004, p. 289). In 2000, 
personnel at the South African ministries of finance and of trade and industry estimated 
the overall return on the arms deal “to be on the order of 94.5 percent ... [and] that during 
the duration of the deal, anticipated exports would be in the region of 280 percent of the 
original purchase price” (Haines, 2004, p. 303). But in his case study, Haines finds 
“substantial hidden costs associated with offsets” (p. 312). For example, substantial state 
investment in regional infrastructure and other resources would be needed for offsets to 
work as planned but were not forthcoming for the cases and regions he examined. “Yet 
this kind of cost is not factored into official assessments of the Strategic Defense Program 
and the associated offset work” (p. 312). 
 
Even if offsets result in higher total contract cost, is it true as politicians claim and as the 
news media repeat that general economic development is stimulated? The evidence is 
mixed, with the balance of evidence pointing to adverse experiences. 
 
A focused approach, in this case targeted on certain key industries, has been taken by 
Taiwan. This differs from Japan and South Korea, both of which have aimed – without 
success – at self-sufficient production in all defence systems. Taiwan realized early on 
that certain “practical obstacles exist that limit the economic impact of offset agreements 
with Taiwan. Analysts have noted that few companies or research organizations within 
Taiwan have sufficient capability to manage large military programs” (Chinworth, 2004, 
p. 245). Limiting work directed toward its civilian sector to 15 percent of all offset work 
“minimizes the multiplier effects of offsets” (Chinworth, pp. 245-246). In Poland, offsets 
are seen as a way to rebuild its ailing defence industry  but whether this succeeds and 
how many sustainable jobs are to be created remains to be seen. At least, the Poles 
appeared to have learned from other countries’ experiences that promises of general 
economic development will likely go unfulfilled (Markowski and Hall, 2004a, p. 172). 
 
Whatever the official rhetoric for public consumption, a number of countries have been 
clear that their primary purpose with arms trade offset work regards not general economic J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  10 
development but development of the indigenous arms industry, for example Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Poland. This is also true of Brazil where “offset policy and practice 
... involving licensed production, coproduction, and technology transfer has been pursued 
not so much for direct economic benefit but to develop Brazil’s arms industry to fulfil a 
certain view of its place in the world” (Perlo-Freeman, 2004, p. 199). 
 
As mentioned, countries that did harbour and pursue expectations of general economic 
development appear to have given up on this objective (e.g., the Nordic countries). 
Nonetheless, some countries still pursue this dream. These include Indonesia and South 
Africa. The case of Indonesia also illustrates a particular vulnerability. Bitzinger writes: 
“The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis was the defining event that forced Jakarta to 
reexamine and ultimately dramatically scale back its ambitious plans for its aerospace 
industry and instead to greatly downsize its arms industry” (2004, p. 264). South Africa 
also has yet to learn from the prevailing experience. Its officials sought to link offset 
projects “with other national economic and industrial policy initiatives, such as ... Spatial 
Development Initiatives and Industrial Development Zones,” even though analysts 
suggested that many of the promised investments were dubious; the analysts now seem to 
have been correct (Dunne and Lamb, 2004, p. 288). In his study on regional economic 
development in South Africa, Haines for instance finds few, if any, positive effects, with 
the arms deal reinforcing the current economic situation and existing regional and other 
inequalities in South Africa (Haines, 2004, p. 303). Overall, virtually no evidence exists 
that general economic development goals are ever achieved via offsets.
6 
 
Another criterion often exploited by officials is that offsets should not merely be 
replacing work that would have been sourced in-country anyway and that their 
employment creation should not be one-off but continuous. Brauer argues that a 
minimum condition for successful indigenous arms production efforts is that civilian 
industry must already exist from which a state may branch out into military-related work 
                                                 
6 This holds even when developed economies are considered. Germany, in the 1950s, may be the only 
exception to the rule. Back then, military and civil technologies and production processes were much more 
closely related to each other than they are now. Indeed, post-WW2 the factories that had been converted to 
produce military equipment were reconverted to civil. This is something most unlikely to happen now 
(Southwood, 1991). J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  11 
(Brauer 1991, 2000). Perlo-Freeman reports that Brazil’s anticipated Mirage fighter 
replacement (on the order of US$700 million) is not thought likely to result in sustainable 
work unless unexpected export orders were to come in (2004, p. 195). Indeed, of all of 
Brazil’s extensive indigenous arms production ventures started since the 1930s with 
various forms of offsets only a single one – Helibras – might be deemed commercially 
viable (p. 196). 
 
Indonesia’s attempt to create an indigenous military and civilian aircraft industry 
collapsed in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia. The main aircraft 
corporation, IPTN, was forced to restructure and, by 2000, accumulated a debt of 
US$570 million. It also had to lay off “around one-third of its workforce, or 5,000 
employees” and anticipates to lay off an additional 3,500 jobs in the near future 
(Bitzinger, 2004, p. 264). The most egregious job generation claim is that of South 
Africa. As mentioned, it claimed that its most recent arms offset deal will result in 65,000 
new jobs over seven years. To Dunne and Lamb, “this sounds impressive but amounts to 
a cost of R1.6 million per job and is extremely high, nearly 20 times the average cost per 
job in South Africa’s defense industry” (2004, p. 288) and it is “not clear that the 
companies will be internationally competitive to allow follow-on industrial development 
to be sustainable” (p. 290).
7 
 
Once more, the main lesson is that there is virtually no positive and certainly no 
compelling evidence that offsets create new, let alone sustainable jobs. 
 
With regard to general and specific technology transfer directed either toward military or 
civilian industry the record is mixed for advanced economies, and generally negative for 
developing and emerging economies. To be sure, some studies report that military-
directed technology transfers originating with offset deals are considered successful in 
some country’s own terms, at least in certain cases. Thus Perlo-Freeman (2004) argues 
that for Brazil Embraer, and the associated aeronautics industry, may represent the 
                                                 
7 An earlier case study on defence offsets in Saudi Arabia “reveals that instead of a projected 75,000 local 
jobs, the various programs generated employment in the region of 2,000” (Matthews, 2002; also see 
Matthews, 1996). J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  12 
clearest success of the technology transfer strategy. They have gradually ascended the 
technological ladder and their military and civil technologies have worked together 
effectively, producing a world-leader in the regional jet market. This has, however, been 
achieved through massive government investment and subsidy, and at the end of the day 
Brazil is nowhere near achieving fully autonomous arms production in any sector (2004, 
p. 198). 
 
Likewise, for India, Baskaran (2004) argues that while there is no question that certain 
technologies were successfully transferred, the industry failed to acquire capabilities 
sufficient to close the technology gap with developed countries and keep pace with 
technological change in weapon systems (p. 219; also p. 224). A particular problem 
seemed to be that technology transfers at the level of whole systems worked less 
efficiently than at component level as sellers tended to withhold core technologies 
(Baskaran, 2004, p. 220). This hints at what Chinworth found for the case of Taiwan, that 
its efforts to develop indigenous systems in the 1990s resulted in items that remained 
heavily dependent on imported technology and that not all domestic development 
programs were successful (p. 246).
8 The relatively more successful case of Singapore 
suggests that they learned from the experience of the other countries. As Bitzinger (2004) 
argues, “Singapore’s defense industry appears to be thriving, largely because of its core 
competencies/niche production business strategy” (p. 264). The available offset work is 
limited in scope but sustainable, even spilling into the non-defence sector. Tellingly, the 
requirement rather than consequence of this strategy is its significant impact on further 
diminishing the nation’s already low attachment to offsets as an industrial policy, and in 
the case of its participation in the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter project the country explicitly 
rejected the idea of offsets (pp. 265-266). 
 
Finally, with regard to South Africa, Dunne and Lamb (2004, p. 288) argue that it must 
be acknowledged that the country has some indigenous industrial capacity that could be 
exploited if South African firms were to be integrated into an emerging European or 
                                                 
8 The Indigenous Fighter Aircraft, for example, ran into cost and quality control problems limiting its 
production run. J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  13 
global arms production supply chain. However, an industrial potential need not and may 
not translate into actual experience. As regards the non-defence industry, the authors 
question the value of the offset deal. For instance, they suggest that it is unclear whether 
South Africa is getting state-of-the-art technology in areas of growth, or old technology 




It is generally accepted that arms imports are needed for legitimate defence purposes, 
although for many countries this may reasonably be disputed (Dumas, 2004). There is 
nonetheless a crying need for countries to obtain a much better idea of what works under 
what circumstances, and what does not work (Taylor, 2004, and Markowski and Hall, 
2004b, offer some guidelines). This is particularly true for developing countries, where 
the opportunity cost of military expenditure can be extremely high. To date, the evidence 
does not suggest that offsets advance countries’ long-term economic or military goals. To 
summarize this evidence, it is now quite clear that offsets do not result in arms 
acquisition cost reductions, that offsets do not stimulate broad-based civilian economic 
development, that neither substantial nor sustained job creation occurs, not even within 
the military sector, that almost no successful technology transfer into the civilian sector is 
observed, and that only limited technology transfer into the military sector occurs, often 
over decades and at high cost. Moreover, whatever technology is transferred is quickly 
outpaced by continuous technology advances in the main developed countries, especially 
the United States. 
 
Clearly the benefits of offsets to the procuring country are open to question, and the only 
way of determining the true value of an offset arrangement to a country is to make a 
detailed analysis. When this has been done the impact on the economy has been much 
smaller than expected or promised (Martin, 1996, Matthews, 2002, Brauer and Dunne, 
2004). The onus to prove otherwise lies with those who would champion the case of 
offsets. Regrettably, their case relies on pre-offset assertions, rather than post-offset 
evidence. As Hartley points out, the incentive is to exaggerate benefits and understate or J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  14 
ignore the costs (2004, p. 121). It would seem that developing countries should beware 





Baskaran, A (2004) “The Role of Offsets in Indian Defence Procurement Policy,” chapter 
15 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory 
Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Batchelor, P and Dunne, J P (2000) “Industrial Participation, Investment and Growth: The 
Case of South Africa’s Defence Related Industry.” Development Southern Africa 17(3), pp. 
417-35.  
 
Batchelor, P and Willett, S (1998) Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjustment in 
South Africa. Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press. 
 
Batchelor, P and Dunne, J P (1998) “The Restructuring of South Africa’s Defence 
Industry.” African Security Review 7(6), pp. 27-43. 
 
Bitzinger, R A (2004) “Offsets and Defense Industrialisation in Indonesia and 
Singapore,” chapter 17 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic 
Development: Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Brauer, J (1991) “Arms Production in Developing Nations: The Relation to Industrial 
Structure, Industrial Diversification, and Human Capital Formation.” Defence Economics 
2(2), pp. 165-75. 
 
Brauer, J (2000) “Potential and Actual Arms Production: Implications for the Arms Trade 
Debate.” Defence and Peace Economics 11(5), pp. 461-80. 
 
Brauer, J (2002) “The Arms Industry in Developing Nations: History and Post-Cold War 
Assessment,” chapter 5 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds.) The Economics of Military 
Expenditure and Arms Production and Trade in Developing Countries. New York: 
Palgrave. 
 
Brauer, J and Dunne, J P, eds. (2004) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, 
Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Chinworth, M W (2004) “Offset Policies and Trends in Jpan, South Korea and Taiwan,” 
chapter 16 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: 
Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  15 
Dumas, L J (2004) “Do Offsets Mitigate or Magnify the Military Burden?” chapter 1 in J 
Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory Policy and 
Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Dunne, J P and Lamb, G (2004) “Defence Industrial Participation: The Experience of 
South Africa,” chapter 19 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic 
Development: Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge.  
 
Dunne, J P (2003) “The Making of Arms in South Africa,” in Economists Allied for Arms 
Reduction (ECAAR) Review 2003. Pearl River, NY: ECAAR. 
 
Dunne, J P (1996) “Economic Effects of Military Spending in LDCs: A Survey,” in 
Gleditsch, N et al. (eds.), The Peace Dividend. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
 
Dunne, J P (1995) “The Defence Industrial Base,” in Hartley, K., and Sandler,T. (eds.) 
Handbook of Defence Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Haines, R J (2004) “Defence Offsets and regional Development in South Africa,” chapter 
20 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory 
Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Hall, P and Markowski, S. (1994) “On the Normality and Abnormality of Offsets 
Obligations,” Defence and Peace Economics 5(3), pp. 173-88. 
 
Hartley, K. (2004) “Offsets and the Joint Strike Fighter in the UK and the Netherlands,” 
chapter 8 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: 
Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Hartley, K (1995) “Industrial Policies in the Defense Sector,” in Hartley, K. and Sandler, 
T. (eds.) Handbook of Defence Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Kinsella, D (2000) “Arms Production in the Third Tier: An Analysis of Opportunity and 
Willingness,” International Interactions 26(3), pp. 253-286. 
 
Krause, K (1992) Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Expenditure and Trade. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Markowski, S. and Hall, P. (2004a) “The Defence Offsets in Poland: An Offsets-based 
Revival?” chapter 12 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic 
Development: Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Markowski, S. and Hall, P. (2004b) “Mandatory Defense Offsets – Conceptual 
Foundations,” chapter 3 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic 
Development: Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 J Brauer and J P Dunne, Arms Trade Offsets and Development page  16 
Markusen, A. (2004) “Arms Trade as Illiberal Trade,” chapter 5 in J Brauer and J P 
Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory Policy and Cases in Arms 
trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Martin, S, ed. (1996) The Economics of Offsets. Amsterdam: Harwood. 
 
Martin, S and Hartley, K (1995) “UK Firms' Experience and Perceptions of Defence 
Offsets: Survey Results.” Defence and Peace Economics 6(2), pp. 123-39. 
 
Matthews, R (1996) “Saudi Arabia's Defence Offset Programmes: Progress, Policy and 
Performance.” Defence and Peace Economics 7(3), pp. 233-51. 
 
Matthews, R (2002) “Saudi Arabia: Defense Offsets and Development,” chapter 8 in J 
Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) The Economics of Military Expenditure and Arms Production 
and Trade in Developing Countries. New York: Palgrave. 
 
Mawsdley, J and Brzoska, M (2004) “Comparing British and German Offset Policies,” 
chapter 7 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: 
Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Perlo Freeman, S. (2004) “Offsets and the Development of the Brazilian Arms Industry,” 
chapter 13 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: 
Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Southwood, P (1991) “Disarming Military Industries: Turning an Outbreak of Peace into 
an Enduring Legacy.” New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Taylor, T. (2004) “Using Procurement Offsets as and Economic Development Strategy,” 
chapter 19 in J Brauer and J P Dunne (eds) Arms Trade and Economic Development: 
Theory Policy and Cases in Arms trade Offsets. London: Routledge. 
 
Udis, B and Maskus, K (1991) “Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from Aerospace.” 
Defence Economics 2(2), pp 151-64. 
 
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration (various 
years). Offsets in Defense Trade: Annual Report to Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
 